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Summary 
This report describes a post-evaluation of GOFREP, the Mandatory Ship Reporting 
System in the Gulf of Finland, initiated by the Finnish Transport Agency in 2016. The 
objective of the evaluation was to show how the safety and fluency of maritime 
transport in the GOFREP area have developed since 2004 when the traffic separation 
scheme (TSS) was complemented by a mandatory ship reporting system and a radar-
based monitoring system (SRS). This GOFREP traffic centre operation was assessed 
using a Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) approach in 2000–2002. The risk 
assessment results of that study (FSA2002) provide reference points to the current 
study. 
 
This evaluation utilized a safety case approach to collect evidence concerning safety 
and fluency of maritime transport and apply safety argumentation based on these. 
Four different lines of safety argumentation were applied: 
 
i) comparison of the predicted traffic densities (as of 2002) to 
observed ones in 2015 in order to check the validity of the 
FSA2002 results of collision probabilities which were based on 
predicted densities - are these results over- / underestimating 
the collision probabilities given the recent observations of the 
traffic? 
ii) analysis of AIS-trajectories in order to see if close encounters 
or near misses have increased or decreased during the period 
2010–2015; 
iii) comparison of accident and incident data in order to compare 
the GOFREP traffic centre operations effectiveness in the 
GOFREP area with the situation in the non-GOFREP area of the 
Baltic Sea north of N 59°; 
iv) assessment of expert opinions in a one-day session about 
GOFREP area’s safety level development and traffic fluency 
over the past 10 years. 
 
The following claims can be stated based on the safety arguments: 
 
• The collision probabilities with one vessel being a passenger vessel were 
over-estimated in the FSA2002 study; 
• The collision probabilities between two oil tankers remain approximately 
the same as assessed in the FSA2002 study;  
• Average distances (in nautical miles) between crossing vessels during the 
ice free period (months 4–10) have grown during 2010–2015; 
• The ratio of accidents (collision and grounding) and incidents in the 
GOFREP area vs. non-GOFREP area are approximately 0.5% and 10%, 




• The general opinion of mariners/officers and GOFREP-operators is that 
the collision probabilities in the GOFREP area have decreased over the 
past 10 years, both during the ice free and the ice period; 
 
The overall conclusion of the study is that the annual collision probabilities are 
decreasing for all vessel types, except oil tankers, and hence the GOFREP study area 
is considered safer now than 10 years ago. According to the study, the four most 
important factors shaping the safety in the GOFREP area are GOFREP-operations, 
TSS, communication between ships and competence of staff. The TSS effectively 
separates the east- and westbound traffic from each other. The benefit from the active 
monitoring and surveillance performed by the GOFREP traffic centres is twofold: The 
presence of the surveillance motivates the seafarers to keep better traffic discipline 
and the GOFREP operators may prevent accidents by active intervention in potentially 
non-safe situations. 
 
The mariners and GOFREP-operators participating in the one-day expert session 
presented further development ideas to improve the safety and fluency of the 
maritime traffic in the GOFREP area. The main improvement suggestions were: 
• More uniform procedures for intervention across operators and areas. All 
parties should intervene in same kind of navigational situations at same 
distances / time frames and in same way. 
• The surveillance could be stricter with a lower threshold to intervene. 
• Electronic route plan exchange service both between vessels and between 
vessels and GOFREP centres. 
• Improved e-navigation services in general. 
• A specific amendment suggestion to the TSS off Hanko: “Traffic to Hanko 
leaves and enters the TSS with such a course that makes give-way vessels 
manoeuvre with big course changes. That could be avoided by making TSS a 
bit longer (eastbound) so the traffic to/from Hanko would meet other traffic 




The project group consisted of researchers from the Finnish Transport Agency and 
VTT Oy. From Finnish Transport Agency the following experts were involved: Samu 
Koski, Sami Dahl, Tuomas Martikainen, Sari Talja, Mikko Turunen, Thomas Erlund, 
Jenni Luomala and Hanna Linjos-Maunula. From VTT Oy the following researchers 
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Porthin providing valuable comments. Hanna Kojo from VTT Oy provided technical 
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meeting. The following external experts took part in the project: 
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1 Introduction 
The GOFREP traffic centre operation was assessed using a Formal Safety Assessment 
(FSA) approach in 2000–2002 (Hänninen et al., 2002). The risk assessment results of 
that study (FSA2002) provide reference points to the current study. In the FSA2002 
study, two blueprints of traffic control systems for the Gulf of Finland – labelled 
VTMIS1 and VTMIS2, were subject to a FSA in order to compare their risk reduction 
potential and cost effectiveness. The study divided the traffic into oil tankers, 
passenger ships and others (mainly containers). Each of these vessel types was 
further divided into two size groups, i.e. large and small. Collision probabilities 
between the vessel types were computed using the GRACAT (Grounding and Collision 
Analysis Toolbox) software. According to the FSA2002 study, the option VTMIS2; a 
change of the existing traffic separation scheme (TSS) together with mandatory ship 
reporting system and a radar-based monitoring system (SRS), would most effectively 
reduce the collision probability between different vessel types during the ice free 
period. The results of the FSA2002 study were part of the application sent to the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2002. The application was approved by 
IMO by resolution MSC.139(76) in 5th December, 2002. The first version of the 
GOFREP system was commenced in 1st July, 2004 with changes as of MSC.231(96) in 
5th December, 2006 - implemented in 1st July, 2007. 
 
In 2015, IMO requested a post-evaluation of the GOFREP system given the evidence 
and experience gained since 2004. This report describes the post-evaluation project 




The research objective of the project was to show how the safety and fluency of 
maritime transport in the GOFREP study area have developed since 2004 when the 
TSS was complemented by a SRS. 
 
The following objectives were defined: 
1. A review of the traffic density in the Gulf of Finland in year 2015 in 
order to make a comparison with the estimates calculated in the 
FSA2002 study; 
2. An analysis based on AIS in order to assess the number and trend 
of close encounters in the GOFREP area; 
3. An analysis of incident and accident data in order to assess safety 
performance of the GOFREP area; 
4. An elicitation of expert judgements on the safety level and 
development needs of the GOFREP area, as well as, specific risk 
factors related to near miss events experienced. 
 
The map in Fig. 1 shows the GOFREP study area divided into subareas A1–A6. These 
subareas were referred to in the one-day expert session that was organized for 
eliciting the experts’ judgments (objective 4). 
 
Figure 1. Subareas of the GOFREP study area: A1. Western border -Hanko separa-
tion East. A2. Off Hanko. A3. Off Helsinki. A4. Off Sköldvik. A5. Off Orre-
grund. A6. Eastern part (Russia). 
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3 Safety case methodology 
The research was conducted using a safety case approach (ONR Guide, 2016; Kelly 
and Weaver, 2004). A safety case should communicate a clear, comprehensive and 
defensible argument that a system is acceptably safe to operate in a particular con-
text. A safety case consists of three principal elements: Requirements, Argument and 
Evidence. The relationship between these three elements is depicted in Fig. 2. 
 
Figure 2. The safety argument communicates the relationship between the evi-
dence and objectives. 
In the project, safety evidence comprised of traffic data compiled from the numbers of 
port calls in the Gulf of Finland, AIS data recorded since 2010, incident and accident 
reports collected by the Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Trafi), as well as, mariners’ 
and GOFREP-operators’ judgments elicited in a one-day expert session organized 25th 
October, 2016. Each of these sources provided the starting point for a safety 
argument, and the safety arguments together formed the basis for the final 
conclusions about the safety development of the GOFREP area during the period 
2004–2015. 
 
The four safety arguments, to be detailed in the subsequent sections, are: 
i) comparison of the predicted traffic volumes (as of 2002) to 
observed ones in 2015 in order to check the validity of the 
FSA2002 results of collision probabilities - are these results 
over- / underestimating the collision probabilities given the 
recent observations of the traffic? 
ii) analysis of AIS-trajectories in order to see if close encounters 
or near misses have increased or decreased during the period 
2010–2015; 
iii) comparison of accident and incident data in order to compare 
GOFREP Traffic Centre Operation effectiveness in the GOFREP 
area with the situation in the non-GOFREP area of the Baltic 
Sea north of N 59°; 
iv) assessment of expert opinions about GOFREP safety level 
development and traffic fluency over the past 10 years. 
10 
 
4 Safety arguments 
4.1  Maritime traffic densities of the Gulf of 
Finland in 2000 and 2015 vs. predicted 
traffic densities for 2010-2015 
For the FSA2002 study, the port call data was collected from the ports for all ship 
types. Locations of these ports are presented in Fig 3. 
 
Figure 3. Locations of the ports in the study. 
In 2000, there were 36 818 port calls in the Gulf of Finland for the ports under study. 
This was the reference situation for making the prediction of traffic densities in 2015 
under different assumptions of annual growth rates, ranging between 2 and 7% 
depending on the country or the port under survey (Rosqvist et al., 2002). In Table 1 
the actual port calls in 2015 are presented together with the realised port calls in 
2000 and estimated port calls for 2010–2015. 
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Table 1. The annual number of port calls (all ship types) in 2000 (Hänninen et al., 
2002), 2015 (references are listed under Port calls data, 2016) and pre-
dicted port calls for the period 2010–2015 (Hänninen et al., 2002). 
 2000 realised 2010–2015 
estimate 
2015 realised 
Hanko 980 2100 1748 
Helsinki 11398 15300 8405 
Sköldvik 916 1150 1117 
Kotka+Hamina 3429 4620 2548 
Vysotsk   884 
Primorsk 0 400 939 
St.Petersburg 9016 13500 5697 
Batareynaja 0 200 0 
Ust-Luga 96 470 2706 
Aseri 0 300 0 
Kunda 600 700 401 
Tallinn 10383 14000 7081 
ALL 36818 52740 31526 
 
 
Regarding oil tankers, the corresponding figures are as show in Table 2. 
Table 2. The annual number of port calls (tankers) in 2000 (Hänninen et al., 
2002), 2015 (references are listed under Port calls data, 2016) and pre-
dicted port calls for the period 2010–2015 (Hänninen et al., 2002). 
 2000 realised 2010–2015 
estimate 
2015 realised 
Helsinki 108 0 39 
Sköldvik 916 1150 1117 
Kotka+Hamina 564 730 362 
Vysotsk   216 
Primorsk 0 400 925 
St.Petersburg 492 740 519 
Batareynaja 0 200 0 
Ust-Luga 0 120 949 
Aseri 0 100 0 
Kunda   7 
Tallinn 679 960 542 





The number of port calls in 2015 in the harbours was 31 526, see Table 1. Hence, the 
traffic density in the Gulf of Finland has decreased from the top level in year 2000 by 
14% in year 2015. The only exception is the oil transport with an increase of almost 
70% as shown in Table 2. 
 
The growth predictions for 2015 made in year 2000 were +43% and +60%, 
respectively. Hence, the prediction regarding oil tanker transport density was quite 
accurate. The increased tanker traffic is due to establishment of new oil ports in 
Primorsk (transportation began 2002), Vysotsk (2004) and Ust-Luga (2011). The 
number of tankers in traffic in the Gulf of Finland has increased (as expected), but in 
addition also the cargo capacity has increased, see Fig. 4, for the oil transportation in 
the Gulf of Finland between 1995 and 2015. The data has been gathered during the 
years by VTT and SYKE together from several sources, mainly directly from the ports 
(references are listed under Oil transportation data, 2016). 
 
On the other hand, based on data regarding Helsinki port, the cargo tonnage has 
increased by 11% and the passenger amount by 32% (Port of Helsinki, 2016). This is 
explained by the increased carrying capacity of different vessel types, both cargo and 
cruise vessels have grown in size. Also the popular passenger traffic between Helsinki 
and Tallinn is nowadays operated using larger vessels. 
 
Figure 4. Oil transportation in the Gulf of Finland between 1995 and 2015 (refer-
ences are listed under Oil transportation data, 2016). 
Certain subareas of GOFREP show a clear deviation upwards compared to the 
predictions: Vysotsk, Ust-Luga and Primorsk, as shown by Fig. 5. The main source of 
the unforeseen traffic stems from tankers, see Fig. 6. 
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Figure 5. Comparison of predicted and observed traffic densities in the main ports 
of the Gulf of Finland (all vessels). 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of predicted and observed traffic densities in the main ports 
of the Gulf of Finland (tankers). 
Based on the difference between the predicted and the observed net traffic density 
alone, the following biases in the FSA2002 collision probabilities can be concluded: i) 
the collision probabilities with one vessel being a passenger vessel are clearly over-
estimated ii) the collision probabilities between two oil tankers remain approximately 
the same. This holds for all cases ‘Baseline’, ‘System1’ and ‘System2’ in the FSA2002-
study[1]. 
 
Despite the new tanker traffic from the above-mentioned new ports, the general 
decrease in traffic drives the annual collision probabilities downwards, compared to 
the predictions for 2010–2015 made in the FSA2002 study. It cannot, however, be 
stated whether the collision probability reduction of System2 (which corresponds 
substantially to the current GOFREP system) is lower or greater than originally 
                                                             
1 Baseline: No additional investments to vessel traffic control in the Gulf of Finland beyond the situation in 
2002 
System1: New routeing system and mandatory reporting system 
System2: New routeing system, mandatory reporting system and a radar-based monitoring system. 
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estimated because the approach does not support the assessment of the probability 
changes. 
 
Hence, it can be argued, that the risk of maritime transport in the GOFREP study area, 
as a whole, is lower than what was predicted in the FSA2002 study, although 
passenger and oil volumes per transport have grown. 
 
4.2 Close encounters and near miss analysis 
based on AIS data 
Close encounters refer to situations where the mariners need to constantly follow the 
behaviour of vessels in its vicinity in order to follow if any deviation from what the 
mariner expects occurs. AIS data is here analysed to detect the number of ship 
encounters in open sea areas where the shortest distance between the vessels during 
the encounters were significantly below the recommended crossing distances for 
encountering ships. Particular focus was put on possible trends in these numbers 
during the years that were the target of the study. Also certain special cases are 
picked for further scrutiny regarding the behaviour in these cases: are they near miss 
situations or normal close encounters? 
 
4.2.1 Trends of close encounters 
The AIS-analysis was based on AIS data collected with 2-minute sampling resolution 
in the time period 2010–2015, and with full resolution in 2011 where maximum 
resolution of 2 seconds was applied to vessels with highest speeds. 
 
The initial sample size covers the 7 month period from April to October, i.e. the open 
sea period in general. The area covered is shown in Fig. 7. The sample size after 
cleaning of incomplete observations, observations where the vessel speed is under 1 
knot, and special vessels (such as fishing boats), the data consisted of 159 000 
observation points (vessel position, velocity and time). 
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Figure 7. The areas - numbered A1 to A6 - were used as a spatial filter in the AIS-
analysis of close encounters. Together they formed a superset of the 
GOFREP area. The GOFREP area is indicated in red in the figure above. 
(Exact coordinates for the subareas are listed in Appendix 1) 
The analysis of these 159 000 observations focused on the metric nautical mile such 
that encounters under 0.3 nm, 0.2 nm, and 0.1 nm where statistically computed 
(Berglund and Pesonen, 2011). Encounter rates are shown in Figs 8–10 where the rate 
has been normalized per the daily average number of vessels moving in the (sub)area 
in order for the encounter rates to be comparable between the areas A1–A6 (see Fig 
7). It should be noted that the type of close encounter: crossing, head-on and 
overtaking is not separately analysed as the aim was to identify the general trend of 
number of short passing distances in the open sea areas. 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
 




A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
 
Figure 9. The trend of close encounters under 0.2 nm during the period 2010–
2015. 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
 
Figure 10. The trend of close encounters under 0.1 nm during the period 2010–
2015. 
The results of Figs. 8 and 9 show a clearly decreasing trend in the number of ships 
passing each other at all distance categories less than 0.3 nm and less than 0.2 nm. 
Fig. 10 shows for areas A5 and A6 a clearly decreasing trend in the number of ships 
passing each other in category less than 0.1 nm. However, for the areas A1–A4 there is 
no discernible trend. The main reason for this is probably the temporal filtering of the 
AIS data in the analysis: close encounters are quickly passing events, which leads to 
bigger errors when the distances are calculated at discrete time intervals. The 
statistical confidence limits of such low numbers of occurrences are also higher. The 
effect of sampling errors in close encounter situations has not been studied enough in 
order to validate the size of this error type. In the case of year 2010, lower AIS data 
accuracy may explain the relatively high rate. 
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Figure 11. The areas with a typical traffic pattern showing the normal routes of the 
vessels in the Gulf of Finland. 
When comparing the number of encounters in different subareas, area A6 has 
significantly higher values than the other areas. One explanation to this is in the 
traffic pattern (Figure 11) showing high local traffic density compared to the other 
areas. The probability of two ships being close to each other is thus higher here than 
in areas where the ship traffic is more evenly distributed over larger areas. This 
probability should, however, be compensated by active distance-keeping measures by 
the ships (like cars keeping a safe distance in spite of slowdowns because of heavy 
traffic). An additional analysis could reveal to what extent the ships have taken active 
measures to keep a safe distance in the different areas, but this has not been possible 
to do within the scope of this study. Another interesting point is that the traffic in area 
A6 is actually outside of the proper GOFREP area (see Figure 11), which could be 
taken as an indicator of the positive effects of the GOFREP system. It is, however, 
important to note the strong decreasing trend also in this area regarding the number 
of ships passing each other at a close distance. 
 
The trend effects cannot be explained as a result of decreasing traffic density as the 
numbers are normalized with the daily average number of vessels moving during that 
time interval (24 h). Although it is not possible to quantify the decrease in risk level 
based on these results alone, there is a clear indication of a positive safety trend as 
fewer ships seem to be involved in close encounters. A more detailed analysis of the 
close encounters less than 0.1 nm was conducted regarding some interesting cases 
detailed below. 
 
4.2.2 Some interesting cases of less than 0.2 nm distance 
The following cases were presented in the expert session in order to gain a better 
understanding of when a close encounter could be categorized as a risky one, labelled 




Case 1 (Head-on): Two cargo ships, crossing near the border of the areas A5 
and A6. DWT 8700 and 5500 tons, length 132 and 128 m. 
Speed 12 and 10 knots. Minimum passing distance: 118m 
(between ship AIS transponder positions). The vessels did 
not alter their courses during the encounter situation, which 
can be taken as an indicator of the ships not perceiving this 
to be a situation requiring evasive manoeuvre (COG 258 and 
76 degrees) 
Case 2 (Head-on): RoRo/passenger ship length 183 m, beam 30 m and oil 
tanker length 170 m, beam 28 m. Speed 17 and 14 knots. 
Encounter east of Hogland, area A6. Minimum passing 
distance: 178 m. The vessels did not alter their courses 
during the encounter situation (COG 231 and 63 degrees). 
Case 3 (Head-on): Vehicles carrier and River barge. DWT 7750 t and 2800 t. 
Length 148 and 82 m. Speed 18 and 8 knots. Encounter east 
of Hogland, area A6. Minimum passing distance: 134 m. 
COG: 239 and 57 degrees. 
Case 4 (Head-on): General cargo vessels. Lengths 95 and 99m. DWT 2554 and 
5871 t. Speed 9 and 14.6 knots. Encounter east of Hogland, 
area A6. Minimum passing distance: 111 m. COG: 79.9 and 
260.2 degrees. 
Case 5 (Crossing): High speed craft and crude oil tanker. Lengths 92 and 252 m. 
DWT 62 and 106000 t. Speed 22 and 8 knots. Encounter 
between Helsinki and Tallinn, area A3. Minimum passing 
distance: 340 m. COG: 358 and 262 degrees. The high speed 
craft passed aft of the tanker which is ok. 
Case 6 (Crossing): General cargo vessel and sailing yacht. Lengths 90 and 34 
m. Speed 9.4 and 7.7 knots. Encounter between Helsinki and 
Tallinn, area A3. Minimum passing distance: 306 m. COG: 
259 and 10 degrees. The sailing yacht passes aft of the 
cargo ship. 
Case 7 (Overtaking): Two river barges. Lengths 114 and 119 m. DWT 4235 t and 
3804 t. Speed 6 knots. Encounter west of Hogland, area A6. 
Minimum overtaking distance: 350 m. COG: 271 and 270 
degrees. 
 
The general opinion was that the cases above were not considered exceptionally risky, 
because the encounter geometries indicated controlled encounters. Another 
explanation by the experts was that in case 7 the vessels were river barges that are 
used to pass each other at a close distance. 
 
A conclusion of the discussion about the cases was that Euclidian distance metrics (= 
straight line) based on AIS data are not alone adequate for identifying near miss 
situations in historical AIS data. Doubts were raised that more complicated metrics, 
like the Vessel Conflict Ranking Operator (Zang 2015), would perform any better. 
 
Instead, it was raised as an opportunity to utilize AIS in real time for monitoring and 
predicting possible emerging close encounter situations which require immediate 




4.3 Comparison of accident and incident data 
between GOFREP and non-GOFREP areas 
The Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Trafi) has compiled and developed an 
interactive web tool for filtering and exploring accident and incident data (Trafi 
merchant shipping risk areas webviewer, 2016). The underlying data sheets were 
provided for this study with the purpose of analysing the performance of GOFREP 
traffic centre operations. 
 
The following formula provides an indication of VTS- or GOFREP-operator 
performance: 
 
Y = a*X 
 
where Y denotes accidents, X denotes operator reactions, and parameter a the rate of 
failure to intervene. In practice, all the variables are uncertain, partly due to variations 
in reporting triggers and incident classifications. It should be noted that the indicator 
is not dependent on traffic densities in the area.  
 
Perfect GOFREP traffic centre -operation would mean that the parameter a  0, i.e. 
all incidents that GOFREP traffic centre operation are expected to interfere with 
actually lead to successful interference and accident avoidance. 
 
The number of accident in the Baltic Sea north of N 59° under the period 2003–2013 
was studied (includes Finnish territorial sea areas, which are equipped with VTS 
services). Based on data provided by the Finnish Traffic Safety Agency, there were 3 
collisions and 0 groundings in the GOFREP area and 25 collisions and 113 groundings 
outside the GOFREP area during that time period. 
 
Based on data provided by the Finnish Traffic Safety Agency, the number of reported 
incidents for the period 2012–2015 regarding navigational error, TSS violation and fail 
to report, are 235 in the GOFREP area and 469 for the non-GOFREP area. These 
incidents may lead to near miss situations or accidents if not reacted upon. Typically, 
such incidents are controlled by VTS or GOFREP traffic centre interference. 
 
The ratio of accidents (collision and grounding) and incidents in the GOFREP area vs. 
non-GOFREP area (i.e. the rate of failure to intervene; parameter ‘a’’ in the above 
formula) are approximately 0.5% and 10% (assuming that the annual incident 
average is applied over the period 2003–2013). The difference is approximately one 
order of magnitude. Because of the scarcity of observations the result is only 
indicative and not conclusive that the GOFREP area is more effective in controlling 
incidents compared to other areas considered here. Also other contributing factors, 
such as differences in operating environment or incident reporting practices, are not 
taken into account here. These introduce uncertainties that cannot be easily 
estimated. 
 






4.4 One-day expert session 
A one-day expert session was organized 25th October, 2016 in order to collect the tacit 
knowledge of both mariners and GOFREP-operators regarding the performance of the 
GOFREP traffic control system. 21 experts took part of the session where the number 
of mariners and GOFREP-operators where almost the same. Also experts from Tallinn 
and St. Petersburg GOFREP traffic centres took part in the session. Appendix 2 shows 
the agenda of the one-day expert session. 
 
The Group Decision Support System (GDSS) called MeetingSphere was utilized for 
collecting the opinions which were then reviewed for further commenting. In order to 
get the opinions statistically easier to analyse several multiple choice questions were 
asked. The structure of the meeting was as follows: 
 
Phase 1: Evaluating the collision risks and the traffic flow 
Phase 2: Risky situations (GOFREP study areas and circumstances) 
Phase 3: Improving the risk management and the traffic fluency 
Phase 4: Feedback on the GDSS process 
 
Expert opinions were collected to a meeting raw report summarising the voting 
results and comments. In the following the main results are presented and comments 
that received high support highlighted. The reader is referred to Appendix 5 for 
further details. 
 
4.4.1 Phase 1: Evaluating collision probabilities and traffic fluency 
The experts gave their opinions regarding the change in collision probabilities, as well 
as, traffic fluency, in the six subareas of GOFREP. In addition to multiple choice 
questions, also free commenting was encouraged. Below key results are presented. 
 
The general opinion was that GOFREP has decreased the collision probability over the 
past 10 years, both during the ice free and the ice periods. Regarding Sköldvik frontal 
zone the change of the collision probability (ice free period) raised opposing opinions 
– positive judgements were dominating, however. Regarding the Eastern part (Russia) 
the change of collision probability as well as traffic fluency during the ice period 
raised opposing opinions - positive judgements were dominating, however. 
 
The comparison between the TSS Åland and the GOFREP regarding the collision 
probability was inconclusive. But comments reveal that GOFREP is judged as less 
risky than TSS Åland, despite of the denser traffic. The main reason for this is the fact 
that the surveillance in the GOFREP area is stricter. The numerical ambiguity in the 
responses may be explained by some experts’ probably wrong interpretation of the 
direction of comparison. 
 
The grounding probability was judged clearly higher for the TSS Åland area due to 
narrowness of fairway and rocks lying in the vicinity of the fairway. 
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Regarding the importance of traffic control function, the experts where asked to rank 
between the following functions: 
1) Traffic separation scheme 
2) GOFREP-operations 
3) Vessel technology, maintenance practices 
4) Communication between ships 
5) Competence of vessel staff 
6) Other navigational aids 
7) Other, specify 
 
The following four functions were found the most important in shaping GOFREP 
area’s safety: GOFREP-operations (14/14 votes), TSS (9/14 votes), Communication 
between ships (7/14 votes) and Competence of vessel staff (7/14). Hence, any 
changes in these lead to notable changes in the safety performance. In other words, 
GOFREP area’s safety is judged to be most sensitive to these functions. 
 
4.4.2 Phase 2: Risky situations (GOFREP study areas and circumstances) 
In the FSA2002 study, eleven risk factors were identified and used as parameters in 
Fault Tree-models explaining an escalation of an encounter to a close encounter and 
further to a near miss (or an accident). The factors are: 
 
NAVE: Navigation error 
= navigation error due to human error, equipment failure, ignorance, etc. 
 
ROPIN: Route planning wrong 
= Route planning is wrong due to negligence, misunderstanding, etc. 
 
INKNOW: Insufficient knowledge 
= The give-way does not understand how to comply with the colreg-rules 
 
RADAR/GV: Radar observation error under good visibility 
= Error in reading the radar due to equipment failure, poor know-how, etc. under good 
visibility 
 
RADAR/PV: Radar observation error under poor visibility 
= Error in reading the radar due to equipment failure, poor know-how, etc. under poor 
visibility 
 
VISUAL: Visual observation failure 
= Visual observation of the traffic pattern has failed under good visibility due e.g. 
fatigue, no-one performing look-out, etc. 
 
REACGA/REACSO: Restricted manoeuvre options  
= Restricted manoeuvring due to vessel properties, traffic pattern, fairway properties, 
etc. 
 
COE: Communication error  
= Communication efforts fail due to technical, cultural, linguistic etc. problems. Also 




SOFO: Stand-on fails to observe 
= Stand-on vessel does not observe the threat of the give-way due to observational 
error 
 
GWNEG: Neglect by give-way 
= Give-way vessel behaves like a cowboy and forces stand-on vessel to react. 
 
 SONEG: Neglect by stand-on 
= Stand-on wants to show he has the right not to take other vessels into account, and 
does not cooperate for the benefit of all. 
 
In the expert session, all these factors where subject to ranking by importance in 
shaping a close encounter/near miss event. The following four were judged as the 
most important:  
1. NAVE - equally relevant in all circumstances; 
2. INKNOW - specifically off Helsinki under traffic peaks; 
3. COE- specifically, in the Eastern part (subarea 6 in Russia); 
4. GWNEG - specifically off Helsinki and under traffic peaks. 
 
The above four causes (factors) were deemed similarly significant in other sea areas 
than GOFREP. Also these factors are better controlled in areas under surveillance, one 
reason being that officers are keen on keeping a good reputation and therefore are 
more focused to the task. The results presented in this section are found in more 
detail in Appendix 5, p. 11–25. 
 
4.4.3 Phase 3: Improving the risk management and the traffic fluency 
The experts ranked the same seven functions as in chapter 4.4.1 with regard to their 
potential in controlling the above collision risk factors (causes). The ranking yielded 
the same four functions which were judged the most sensitive ones for the GOFREP 
system performance: GOFREP-operations (11/14 votes), TSS (8/14 votes), 
Communication between ships (6/14 votes) and Competence of staff (5/14). The 
similarity of the results confirms consistency of the experts’ judgments. 
 
About thirty specific comments were submitted, see p. 27–28 in Appendix 5. 
According to the participants, the main strengths of the current GOFREP system are 
the TSS separating the east- and westbound traffic from each other and the active 
monitoring and surveillance performed by the GOFREP traffic centres. The benefit 
from the surveillance is twofold: The presence of the surveillance motivates the 
seafarers to keep better traffic discipline and the GOFREP operators may prevent 
accidents by active intervention in potentially non-safe situations. 
 
The main improvement suggestions were: 
• More uniform procedures for intervention across operators and areas. All 
parties should intervene in same kind of navigational situations at same 
distances / time frames and in same way. 
• The surveillance could be stricter with a lower threshold to intervene. 
• Electronic route plan exchange service both between vessels and between 
vessels and GOFREP centres. 
• Improved e-navigation services in general. 
• A specific amendment suggestion to the TSS off Hanko: “Traffic to Hanko 
leaves and enters the TSS with such a course that makes give-way vessels 
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manoeuvre with big course changes. That could be avoided by making TSS a 
bit longer (eastbound) so the traffic to/from Hanko would meet other traffic 
with 90 deg angle.” 
 
Regarding non-regular cruise ships and high speed passenger crafts the general 
opinion was that they can better adjust to the traffic pattern and do not increase 
collision risk. An exception could be peak hours in dense traffic areas where a high 
speed craft may disturb the observations regarding other vessels. In addition, the 
plans for introduction of traffic by wing in ground (WIG) craft between Helsinki and 
Tallinn, operating at very high speed, was seen as a potential risk factor. 
 
Regarding functions that would increase the fluency of transport many ideas where 
raised similar to those for controlling the risk factors above. This leads to a conjecture 
that the GOFREP risk control is not seen as a regulatory issue decreasing the traffic 
fluency, but rather the opposite: transport safety implies transport fluency. 
 
4.4.4 Phase 4: feedback on the GDSS process 
The experts considered the GDSS approach a good method for addressing GOFREP 
safety issues. The available expertise was considered adequate by the majority of the 
participants. The approach could be used for studying some cases with the aim of 
learning from close encounter or near miss events. Further comments are found in 




The project utilized a safety case approach to collect evidence and apply safety 
argumentation based on these. Four different lines of safety argumentation were 
applied: 
 
i) comparison of the predicted traffic densities (as of 2002) to 
observed ones in 2015 in order to check the validity of the 
FSA2002 results of collision probabilities which were based on 
predicted densities - are these results over- / underestimating 
the collision probabilities given the recent observations of the 
traffic? 
ii) analysis of AIS-trajectories in order to see if close encounters 
or near misses have increased or decreased during the period 
2010-2015; 
iii) comparison of accident and incident data in order to compare 
the GOFREP traffic centre operations effectiveness in the 
GOFREP area with the situation in the non-GOFREP area of the 
Baltic Sea north of N 59°; 
iv) assessment of expert opinions in a one-day session about 
GOFREP area’s safety level development and traffic fluency 
over the past 10 years. 
 
The following claims can be stated based on the safety arguments: 
 
• The collision probabilities with one vessel being a passenger vessel were 
over-estimated in the FSA2002 study; 
• The collision probabilities between two oil tankers remain approximately 
the same as assessed in the FSA2002 study;  
• Average distances (in nautical miles) between crossing vessels during the 
ice free period (months 4–10) have grown during 2010–2015; 
• The ratio of accidents (collision and grounding) and incidents in the 
GOFREP area vs. non-GOFREP area are approximately 0,5% and 10%, 
respectively, suggesting that the GOFREP area is very effective in 
controlling incidents; 
• The general opinion of mariners/officers and GOFREP-operators is that 
the collision probabilities in the GOFREP area have decreased over the 
past 10 years, both during the ice free and the ice period; 
 
The overall conclusion of the study is that the annual collision probabilities are 
decreasing for all vessel types, except oil tankers, and hence the GOFREP area is safer 
than 10 years ago. According to the study, the four most important factors shaping 
the safety in the GOFREP area are GOFREP-operations, TSS, communication between 
ships and competence of staff. The TSS effectively separates the east- and westbound 
traffic from each other. The benefit from the active monitoring and surveillance 
performed by the GOFREP traffic centres is twofold: The presence of the surveillance 
motivates the seafarers to keep better traffic discipline and the GOFREP operators 
may prevent accidents by active intervention in potentially non-safe situations. 
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The mariners and GOFREP-operators participating in the one-day expert session 
presented further development ideas to improve the safety and fluency of the 
maritime traffic in the GOFREP area. The main improvement suggestions were: 
• More uniform procedures for intervention across operators and areas. All 
parties should intervene in same kind of navigational situations at same 
distances / time frames and in same way. 
• The surveillance could be stricter with a lower threshold to intervene. 
• Electronic route plan exchange service both between vessels and between 
vessels and GOFREP centres. 
• Improved e-navigation services in general. 
• A specific amendment suggestion to the TSS off Hanko: “Traffic to Hanko 
leaves and enters the TSS with such a course that makes give-way vessels 
manoeuvre with big course changes. That could be avoided by making TSS a 
bit longer (eastbound) so the traffic to/from Hanko would meet other traffic 
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Coordinates of the subareas used in the AIS Analysis
A1 
1 59 33.3 22 30.0 
2 59 36.5 22 38.1 
3 59 37.9 22 50.0 
4 59 19.0 22 50.0 
5 59 17.5 22 43.9 
6 59 17.7 22 36.1 
7 59 16.2 22 23.8 
8 59 14.7 22 18.4 
9 59 03.4 21 50.9 
10 59 02.1 21 49.0 
11 59 10.0 21 30.0 
A2 
1 59 37.9 22 50.0 
2 59 38.1 22 51.4 
3 59 39.4 23 21.1 
4 59 47.0 24 12.4 
5 59 47.3 24 15.0 
6 59 37.6 24 15.0 
7 59 34.6 23 57.1 
8 59 28.9 23 31.2 
9 59 19.0 22 50.0 
A3 
1 59 47.3 24 15.0 
2 59 47.8 24 19.9 
3 59 49.0 24 29.3 
4 59 53.5 24 47.1 
5 59 55.3 24 55.8 
6 59 56.6 25 10.2 
7 59 56.4 25 15.0 
8 59 44.5 25 15.0 
9 59 40.0 24 28.8 
10 59 37.6 24 15.0 
A4 
1 59 56.4 25 15.0 
2 59 55.9 25 28.3 
3 59 55.7 25 35.0 
4 59 55.9 25 37.2 
5 59 57.9 25 55.0 
6 59 48.3 25 55.0 
7 59 44.5 25 15.0 
A5 
1 59 57.9 25 55.0 
2 59 58.6 26 01.0 
3 60 00.8 26 04.5 
4 60 02.3 26 11.3 
5 60 02.8 26 17.7 
6 60 09.2 26 29.5 
7 60 09.2 26 30.0 
8 59 51.3 26 30.0 
9 59 48.9 26 01.2 
10 59 48.3 25 55.0 
A6 
1 60 09.2 26 30.0 
2 60 09.7 26 36.7 
3 60 11.4 26 44.5 
4 60 12.0 26 45.9 
5 60 12.0 27 13.4 
6 60 12.0 27 17.6 
7 60 00.0 27 30.0 
8 59 53.4 26 55.2 
9 59 51.3 26 30.0 
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Appendix 2 
 Invitation to expert workshop - GOFREP 
Safety development in the international waters of the Gulf of Finland: 
GOFREP workshop 
 
Time: 25 October 2016 at 9:00 – 15:30 
 
Place: Finnish Transport Agency, Opastinsilta 12, Helsinki, Senate meeting 
room Merkurius 
 
Programme of the day 
 
8:30 Coffee and registration 
 
9:00 Opening of the workshop 
- GOFREP workshop assessment for the IMO (Thomas Erlund, FTA) 
- The objective and phases of the computer-aided workshop (Tony Rosqvist, 
VTT) 
 
9:30 Workshop phase 1: General assessment of GOFREPs impact on colli-
sion risks and vessel traffic flow 
 
Questions presented by Tony Rosqvist: 
- Development of GOFREP area in terms of collision risks and vessel traffic 
flow: what factors have affected development the most? Open water sea-
son/winter season. 
 
11:00 Workshop phase 2: Incidents in the GOFREP area 
 
Introduction: Incidents based on an AIS analysis (Robin Berglund, VTT) 
 
Questions presented by Tony Rosqvist: 
- What factors causing incidents have been most critical in light of previous 
experience? 
- In what areas and under what conditions are the factors causing incidents 




13:30 Workshop phase 3: Development of risk management and smooth traf-
fic flow in the GOFREP area 
 
Questions presented by Tony Rosqvist 
- What have we learnt/should we learn from incidents? 
 
15:00 Coffee break 
 




In GOFREP Outside GOFREP Grand Total
2003 1 19 20
capsize 2 2
Grounding 10 10
Collision to navigation mark/quay 2 2
collision 1 5 6
2004 13 13
Grounding 6 6








Collision to navigation mark/quay 3 3
collision 3 3
2007 1 12 13
Grounding 9 9













Collision to navigation mark/quay 1 1
collision 1 1
2011 1 12 13
capsize 1 1
Grounding 6 6
Collision to navigation mark/quay 2 2
collision 1 3 4
2012 14 14
Grounding 11 11
Collision to navigation mark/quay 3 3
2013 59 137 196
Could not contact the vessel 1 1
Anchor dragging 2 2
Anchor lost 1 1
ALL ACCIDENT TYPES
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Colreg/reporting violation 47 70 117
Towing problem 1 1
capsize 1 1
Grounding 14 14
Technical failure 1 1 2
Near miss 3 7 10
Near miss with sailing boat 1 1
Grounding prevention 9 9
Other 1 1 2
Navigational Assistance Service 3 3
Navigating outside of fairway area 3 3
Rudder failure 1 1
Collision to navigation mark/quay 3 3
Causing danger to other traffic 6 8 14
Collision 1 3 4
fairway 7 7
2014 57 170 227
Black Out 5 5
Colreg/reporting violation 49 94 143
No charts 1 1
Towing problem 1 1
Deck cargo shifting/loss 1 1
Grounding 8 8
Technical failure 2 9 11
Towing problem 7 7
Near miss 2 8 10
Near miss with sailing boat 3 3
Grounding prevention 9 9
Navigating outside of fairway area 6 6
Fire 1 1
Collision to navigation mark/quay 6 6
Causing danger to other traffic 4 7 11
Leakage 1 1
Exceeding maximum draught for 3 3
Grand Total 119 449 568
Collision total 3 25
Grounding total 0 113
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INCIDENT STATISTICS 2012-2015
In GOFREP Not in GOFREP No position Grand Total In GOFREP Not in GOFREP
Incident categories 2012 73 234 74 381 --> 60 135
grounding 20 4 1 5
collision 30 1 1
fire, explosion 40 3 3
machine failure 60 10 3 13
vessel damage 70 1 1
equipment failure including design faults 110 3 39 33 75
other vessel error 130 4 7 6 17
environmental hazard 140 1 1
other external failures 160 1 3 4
reporting obligation 200 11 15 26
traffic separation scheme 210 47 112 1 160
port manoeuvre 220 3 3
environmental damage 230 1 1
piloting boarding/disembarking 240 1 1
navigational error 250 2 8 7 17
Unknown causes 270 2 2
non-categorized (blank) 6 36 9 51
2013 99 242 47 388 --> 70 132
grounding 20 8 8
collision 30 5 1 6
fire, explosion 40 1 2 3
Failure in hull or water tight doors 50 1 1
equipment failure including design faults 110 27 70 27 124
other vessel error 130 1 3 4 8
environmental hazard 140 8 8
Error in navigational infrastructure 150 2 2 4
other external failures 160 4 2 6
’200’ + ’210’ + ’250’
INCIDENT TYPES:ALL INCIDENT TYPES
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reporting obligation 200 17 15 3 35
traffic separation scheme 210 50 94 1 145
port manoeuvre 220 3 3 6
piloting boarding/disembarking 240 4 1 5
navigational error 250 3 23 3 29
2014 117 272 27 416 --> 70 136
0 0 1 1
grounding 20 4 4
collision 30 3 2 5
fire, explosion 40 1 1
Failure in hull or water tight doors 50 1 1
capsizing 80 1 1
equipment failure including design faults 110 43 83 14 140
cargo 120 2 2
other vessel error 130 3 6 1 10
environmental hazard 140 4 2 6
Error in navigational infrastructure 150 2 2
other external failures 160 14 3 17
reporting obligation 200 23 19 3 45
traffic separation scheme 210 46 97 1 144
port manoeuvre 220 4 4
environmental hazard 230 1 1 2
 pilot boarding /disembarking 240 8 8
navigational error 250 1 20 21
Unknown causes 270 1 1
2015 75 179 32 286 --> 35 66
grounding 20 3 3
collision 30 2 2 4
fire, explosion 40 1 1
capsizing 80 1 1
equipment failure including design faults 110 37 71 22 130
cargo 120 1 1
other vessel error 130 2 2 2 6
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environmental hazard 140 3 3
other external failures 160 21 3 24
reporting obligation 200 10 6 16
traffic separation scheme 210 25 51 76
port manoeuvre 220 1 1
pilot boarding /disembarking 240 5 5
navigational error 250 9 1 10
Unknown causes 270 3 2 5
Grand Total 364 927 180 1471 --> 175 334
Yearly average 43,75 83,5
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Report GOFREP workshop
Date August 31, 2016
Location Helsinki, Turku, Web
Hosts
Facilitator
Thomas Erlund, Jenni Luomala (FTA), Tony Rosqv ist (VTT)
Tony Rosqvist (VTT)
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1 Phase1: evaluating the collision risks and the traffic flow 1.1 Multi-criteria Rating: Rate area 1,
Rate area 2, Rate area 3, Rate area 4,
Rate area 5, Rate area 6
Report GOFREP workshop
1 Phase1: evaluating the collision risks and the traffic flow
1.1 Multi-criteria Rating: Rate area 1, Rate area 2, Rate area 3, Rate area 4, Rate
area 5, Rate area 6
1.1.1.T0 Phase 1, Area 1 Western border - Hanko separation area east  (rating by
numeric scale) sorted by Source order
14 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 1.1.1
Area 1 Western border - Hanko separation area east  Consider a time period of the last 10 years!
Label for scale value
1 = to noticeably
worse




4 = to slightly
better
5 = to noticeably
better
Phase 1, Area 1 Western border - Hanko separation area east  (rating by numeric scale) sorted by
Source order
Criterion "Rate area 1". 5 items.
Scale: 1-5. Abstentions not permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item 1 2 3 4 5 Mean SD n
1 Has the collision probability
changed? (ice free period)
0 1 3 7 3 3.86 0.21 14
2 Has the grounding probability
changed? (ice free period)
0 0 4 6 4 4.00 0.19 14
3 Has the traffic fluency changed in
this area? (ice free period)
0 1 1 8 4 4.07 0.20 14
4 Has the collision probability
changed? (ice period)
0 2 4 5 3 3.64 0.24 14
5 Has the traffic fluency changed in
this area? (ice period)
0 2 1 9 2 3.79 0.22 14
1.1.2.T0 Phase 1, Area 2 Hanko frontal zone (rating by numeric scale) sorted by
Source order
14 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 1.1.2
Area 2, Off Hanko  Consider a time period of the last 10 years!
Label for scale value
1 = to noticeably
worse




4 = to slightly
better
5 = to noticeably
better
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1 Phase1: evaluating the collision risks and the traffic flow 1.1.3.T0 Phase 1, Area 3 Helsinki frontal
zone (rating by numeric scale) sorted by
Mean
Report GOFREP workshop
Phase 1, Area 2 Hanko frontal zone (rating by numeric scale) sorted by Source order
Criterion "Rate area 2". 5 items.
Scale: 1-5. Abstentions not permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item 1 2 3 4 5 Mean SD n
1 Has the collision probability
changed? (ice free period)
0 1 4 6 3 3.79 0.22 14
2 Has the grounding probability
changed? (ice free period)
0 0 4 8 2 3.86 0.16 14
3 Has the traffic fluency changed in
this area? (ice free period)
0 1 3 7 3 3.86 0.21 14
4 Has the collision probability
changed? (ice period)
0 0 5 7 2 3.79 0.17 14
5 Has the traffic fluency changed in
this area? (ice period)
0 1 3 8 2 3.79 0.19 14
1.1.3.T0 Phase 1, Area 3 Helsinki frontal zone (rating by numeric scale) sorted by
Mean
13 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 1.1.3
Area 3 Off Helsinki  Consider a time period of the last 10 years!
Label for scale value
1 = to noticeably
worse




4 = to slightly
better
5 = to noticeably
better
Phase 1, Area 3 Helsinki frontal zone (rating by numeric scale) sorted by Mean
Criterion "Rate area 3". 5 items.
Scale: 1-5. Abstentions not permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item 1 2 3 4 5 Mean SD n
2 Has the grounding probability
changed? (ice free period)
0 0 5 4 4 3.92 0.21 13
1 Has the collision probability
changed? (ice free period)
0 2 2 4 5 3.92 0.27 13
3 Has the traffic fluency changed in
this area? (ice free period)
0 3 0 7 3 3.77 0.26 13
4 Has the collision probability
changed? (ice period)
0 2 4 4 3 3.62 0.25 13
5 Has the traffic fluency changed in
this area? (ice period)
0 2 4 5 2 3.54 0.23 13
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1 Phase1: evaluating the collision risks and the traffic flow 1.1.4.T0 Phase 1, Area 4 Kilpilahti frontal
zone (rating by numeric scale) sorted by
Source order
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1.1.4.T0 Phase 1, Area 4 Kilpilahti frontal zone (rating by numeric scale) sorted by
Source order
14 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 1.1.4
Area 4 Off Kilpilahti  Consider a time period of the last 10 years!
Label for scale value
1 = to noticeably
worse




4 = to slightly
better
5 = to noticeably
better
Phase 1, Area 4 Kilpilahti frontal zone (rating by numeric scale) sorted by Source order
Criterion "Rate area 4". 5 items.
Scale: 1-5. Abstentions not permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item 1 2 3 4 5 Mean SD n
1 Has the collision probability
changed? (ice free period)
0 4 2 4 4 3.57 0.29 14
2 Has the grounding probability
changed? (ice free period)
0 1 5 5 3 3.71 0.22 14
3 Has the traffic fluency changed in
this area? (ice free period)
0 2 3 8 1 3.57 0.21 14
4 Has the collision probability
changed? (ice period)
0 1 4 7 2 3.71 0.20 14
5 Has the traffic fluency changed in
this area? (ice period)
0 1 4 7 2 3.71 0.20 14
1.1.5.T0 Phase 1, Area 5  Orregrund frontal zone (rating by numeric scale) sorted
by Source order
14 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 1.1.5
Off Orregrund  Consider a time period of the last 10 years!
Label for scale value
1 = to noticeably
worse




4 = to slightly
better
5 = to noticeably
better
Phase 1, Area 5  Orregrund frontal zone (rating by numeric scale) sorted by Source order
Criterion "Rate area 5". 5 items.
Scale: 1-5. Abstentions not permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item 1 2 3 4 5 Mean SD n
1 Has the collision probability
changed? (ice free period)
0 2 3 6 3 3.71 0.24 14
2 Has the grounding probability
changed? (ice free period)
0 0 3 9 2 3.93 0.15 14
3 Has the traffic fluency changed in
this area? (ice free period)
0 2 4 6 2 3.57 0.23 14
Appendix 5 / 4 (30)
1 Phase1: evaluating the collision risks and the traffic flow 1.1.6.T0 Phase 1, Area 6 Eastern part
(Russia) (rating by numeric scale) sorted
by Mean
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Phase 1, Area 5  Orregrund frontal zone (rating by numeric scale) sorted by Source order
Criterion "Rate area 5". 5 items.
Scale: 1-5. Abstentions not permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item 1 2 3 4 5 Mean SD n
4 Has the collision probability
changed? (ice period)
0 1 5 6 2 3.64 0.20 14
5 Has the traffic fluency changed in
this area? (ice period)
0 2 3 8 1 3.57 0.21 14
1.1.6.T0 Phase 1, Area 6 Eastern part (Russia) (rating by numeric scale) sorted by
Mean
12 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 1.1.6
Area 6 Eastern part (Russia)  Consider a time period of the last 10 years!
Label for scale value
1 = to noticeably
worse




4 = to slightly
better
5 = to noticeably
better
Phase 1, Area 6 Eastern part (Russia) (rating by numeric scale) sorted by Mean
Criterion "Rate area 6". 5 items.
Scale: 1-5. Abstentions not permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item 1 2 3 4 5 Mean SD n
1 Has the collision probability
changed? (ice free period)
0 1 4 3 4 3.83 0.25 12
2 Has the grounding probability
changed? (ice free period)
0 1 5 2 4 3.75 0.25 12
3 Has the traffic fluency changed in
this area? (ice free period)
0 2 3 5 2 3.58 0.24 12
4 Has the collision probability
changed? (ice period)
1 0 5 3 3 3.58 0.28 12
5 Has the traffic fluency changed in
this area? (ice period)
1 1 3 5 2 3.50 0.28 12
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1 Phase1: evaluating the collision risks and the traffic flow 1.1.M0 Rate area 1, Rate area 2, Rate
area 3, Rate area 4, Rate area 5, Rate
area 6 (Criteria: Rate area 1 / Rate area 2
/ Rate area 3 / Rate area 4 / Rate area 5
/ Rate area 6)
Report GOFREP workshop
1.1.M0 Rate area 1, Rate area 2, Rate area 3, Rate area 4, Rate area 5, Rate area
6 (Criteria: Rate area 1 / Rate area 2 / Rate area 3 / Rate area 4 / Rate area 5 /
Rate area 6)
Specification of the Ratings
Criterion: "Rate area 1". Rating 1.1.1 "Area 1 Western border - Hanko separation area east" Scale: 1-
5. 5 Rating items.   Abstentions not permitted. Item list not randomized.
Criterion: "Rate area 2". Rating 1.1.2 "Area 2, Off Hanko" Scale: 1-5. 5 Rating items.   Abstentions not
permitted. Item list not randomized.
Criterion: "Rate area 3". Rating 1.1.3 "Area 3 Off Helsinki" Scale: 1-5. 5 Rating items.   Abstentions not
permitted. Item list not randomized.
Criterion: "Rate area 4". Rating 1.1.4 "Area 4 Off Kilpilahti" Scale: 1-5. 5 Rating items.   Abstentions
not permitted. Item list not randomized.
Criterion: "Rate area 5". Rating 1.1.5 "Off Orregrund" Scale: 1-5. 5 Rating items.   Abstentions not
permitted. Item list not randomized.
Criterion: "Rate area 6". Rating 1.1.6 "Area 6 Eastern part (Russia)" Scale: 1-5. 5 Rating items.
Abstentions not permitted. Item list not randomized.
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1 Phase1: evaluating the collision risks and the traffic flow 1.1.M0 Rate area 1, Rate area 2, Rate area 3, Rate area 4, Rate area 5, Rate
area 6 (Criteria: Rate area 1 / Rate area 2 / Rate area 3 / Rate area 4 / Rate
area 5 / Rate area 6)
Report GOFREP workshop
Rate area 1, Rate area 2, Rate area 3, Rate area 4, Rate area 5, Rate area 6 (Multi-criteria table) sorted by Mean
Rate area 1 Rate area 2 Rate area 3
Nr Item Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
3 Has the traffic fluency changed in this area? (ice free period) 4.07 0.20 3.86 0.21 3.77 0.26
2 Has the grounding probability changed? (ice free period) 4.00 0.19 3.86 0.16 3.92 0.21
1 Has the collision probability changed? (ice free period) 3.86 0.21 3.79 0.22 3.92 0.27
5 Has the traffic fluency changed in this area? (ice period) 3.79 0.22 3.79 0.19 3.54 0.23
4 Has the collision probability changed? (ice period) 3.64 0.24 3.79 0.17 3.62 0.25
Rate area 1, Rate area 2, Rate area 3, Rate area 4, Rate area 5, Rate area 6 (Multi-criteria table) sorted by Mean
Rate area 4 Rate area 5 Rate area 6
Nr Item Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
3 Has the traffic fluency changed in this area? (ice free period) 3.57 0.21 3.57 0.23 3.58 0.24
2 Has the grounding probability changed? (ice free period) 3.71 0.22 3.93 0.15 3.75 0.25
1 Has the collision probability changed? (ice free period) 3.57 0.29 3.71 0.24 3.83 0.25
5 Has the traffic fluency changed in this area? (ice period) 3.71 0.20 3.57 0.21 3.50 0.28
4 Has the collision probability changed? (ice period) 3.71 0.20 3.64 0.20 3.58 0.28
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1 Phase1: evaluating the collision risks and the traffic flow 1.2 Rating: Phase 1, comparing to TSS
Åland
Report GOFREP workshop
1.2 Rating: Phase 1, comparing to TSS Åland
1.2.1.T0 Phase 1, comparing to TSS Åland (rating by numeric scale) sorted by
Source order
13 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 1.2.1
Compare risk levels in GOFREP area and in Åland











Phase 1, comparing to TSS Åland (rating by numeric scale) sorted by Source order
Criterion "rate". 2 items.
Scale: 1-5. Abstentions not permitted. List of items randomized.
Nr Item 1 2 3 4 5 Mean SD n
1 What is the collision probability in
the GOFREP area compared to TSS
Åland? Consider the open sea
period.
1 6 0 5 1 2.92 0.30 13
2 What is the grounding probability
in the GOFREP area compared to
TSS Åland? Consider the open sea
period.
0 1 2 7 3 3.92 0.21 13
What is the collision probability in the GOFREP area compared to TSS Åland? Consider the open
sea period.
Scale value 2 "rate"
- Traffic density is higher in certain GOFREP areas (#1)
- Plese see the comment on question. (#5)
- Crossing traffic Helsinki - Tallinn more frecvent than in Åland. (#6)
- PSuurempi  liikeentiheys verrattuna A.maan alueen liikenteeseen (#9)
Scale value 1 "rate"
- Much more traffic in the GOFREP area (#2)
Scale value 5 "rate"
- The risk is much smaller because TSS Åland has not any mandatory ship reporting. There is
not a similar surveillance as in the Gofrep. For example Sweden has a "watch dog" system
watching over the COLREG`s in the Åland Sea when the Finnish side has a person watching
over the situation. The automated system can not interviene with the arising collision
situation. Ofcourse more traffic in the Gulf of Finland... (#7)
What is the grounding probability in the GOFREP area compared to TSS Åland? Consider the
open sea period.
Scale value 5 "rate"
- Not many grounds in the GOFREP area. (#1)
Scale value 2 "rate"
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1 Phase1: evaluating the collision risks and the traffic flow 1.3 Rating: Phase 1 Evaluating the
factors concerning the risk
Report GOFREP workshop
- Åland sea trafic is very active and making this fairway area safer to navigate. GOFREP is less
active in this field. (#4)
Scale value 4 "rate"
- In TSS Åland area is  more narrow and islands & rocks are closer. (#5)
- The risk is much bigger. More shallows in the Aland Sea area. (#6)
- A;maan alueella huomattavasti enemmän kareja tms verrattuna GOFREP-alueen vesiin (#8)
1.3 Rating: Phase 1 Evaluating the factors concerning the risk
1.3.1.T0 Phase 1 Evaluating the factors concerning the risk (multiple selection)
sorted by Source order
16 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 1.3.1
Which of these factors explain the changes in risk levels?  Please, choose the THREE (3) most
important factors!
Phase 1 Evaluating the factors concerning the risk (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "The most important factors". 3 selections of 7 items.
Ratings submitted: 16. Total selections 43. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
1 Traffic separation scheme 9
2 GOFREP-operations 14
3 Vessel technology, maintenance practices 2
4 Communication between ships 7
5 Competence of vessel staff 7
6 Other navigational aids 3
7 other, specify 1
Traffic separation scheme
Not selected "The most important factors"
- N/A (#2)
- It contribiutes to the whole gofrep area and mainly to the are GOFREP3. It separates
opposite vessel traffic, reduces vessels dispersion, separates vessels joining to th TSS in
Porkkala West TSS. So it lowers the risk of collision. The most dangerous are traffic crossing
areas when bunches of vessels are crossing each other routes.. (#20)
Selected "The most important factors"
- Lower the risk cause it keeps vessels on contratory course clearly away from each other. (#7)
- Area 3, collisinón risk is higher. Rising the risk. (#10)
- TSS make vessels navigate in safe courses and makes the rules of the road clearer. (#13)
- area 3. separation scheme between Helsinki and Tallinn lower the risk to collision due the
crossing traffic. (#17)
- Separation of the traffic flow reduses  probability of collisions (#19)
- Areas 2, 3, 6 (#21)
GOFREP-operations
Not selected "The most important factors"
- N/A (#2)
Selected "The most important factors"
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1 Phase1: evaluating the collision risks and the traffic flow 1.3.1.T0 Phase 1 Evaluating the factors
concerning the risk (multiple selection)
sorted by Source order
Report GOFREP workshop
- All areas. In common the "liikennekuri" is better because vessels know that someone is
watching. GOFREP operators remind vessels of the colregs and their duties as give way
vessels. (#7)
- Lower the risk. Navigators know that they are under surveilance and they also get the info
about other traffic from VHF ch.60. Gofrep operators also notifies vessels with collision
course, navigating in TSZ or manouvering oddly. (#9)
- GOFREP-operations are veryimportant to reduce the risk of grounding and collission. (#11)
- Area 3, the collission risk, rising. (#14)
- Gofrep operations can make safety better if the operator is active. (#17)
- Area 3, see previous. (#21)
- The monitoring by the GOFREP or VTS operators is the second step of control to prevent
negative effect of human factor (navigation mistake). If the first step of control fails we have
reserve: influence of the GOFREP or VTS operator. (#23)
- GOFREP 3. Information exchange between TLL and HEL GOFREP operators. Situations forms
in one area of responsibility but finalize in other area. There have to be kind of route or
"intention" exchange procedures between gofrep centres enabling operators to predict
situations earlier than entering into their area of responsibility. (#24)
- Surveillance is important tool for cotrolling that TSS regulations are followed by all ships.
GOFREP is good system for preventing collisions. (#27)
- Gofrep operations lower the grounding risks in all areas (#28)
Vessel technology, maintenance practices
Not selected "The most important factors"
- N/A (#2)
- No effect (#6)
Selected "The most important factors"
- Lower the risk. AIS and eletronic charts raise the awareness of traffic situation around you.
(#4)
- High tech level makes safety marginals smaller. So it might make safety worse. (#7)
Communication between ships
Not selected "The most important factors"
- N/A (#2)
- This is fifty-fifty. Cause sometimes communication between vessels is good and sometimes
it just confuses more. Too much talk can affect others listening and using the same channel.
(#7)
- Communication is better. (#11)
Selected "The most important factors"
- It is better to be quiet than have bad communications. Communtications between ships
usually leads to misunderstandings. GOFREP-operations important. (#8)
- Language skils onboard ships are nowdays poor. (#10)
- Easier to communicate with other vessels, to avoid close situtation. (#13)
- In areas 2 and 3 the communication between the vessels is improtant because of the
crossing traffic (#15)
Competence of vessel staff
Selected "The most important factors"
- N/A (#2)
- All areas.  Vessels are taking knowingly risks with close overtaking distances, and navigating
close to shallow waters. Seems that they are blindly following route plans on ecdis. Rises
risks because there are not extra margins for errors or tecnical failure. (#5)
- The sailors are navigating the ships. Not GOFREP operators or other shore staff (#9)
- competence of vessel staff nowdayswery poor. (#12)
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2 Phase 2: Risky situations 2.1 Multi-criteria Rating: (1) NAVE, (2)
ROPIN, (3) INKNOW, (4) RADAR/GV, (5)
RADAR/PV, 6 VISUAL, 7




Not selected "The most important factors"
- Rise the risk. Nowadays have noticed that the trend that competence is going down. Dont
know if its the economics that pushes the companies to hire staff were they can get it
cheapest? (#7)
- Sometimes have to be better.E.G. language skills, specially when the crew is from Far East:
(#17)
Other navigational aids
Selected "The most important factors"
- All areas. Ecdis, AIS and evolved navigational systems lower risk of collision and grounding
when used wisely. (#5)
- Use of electronic charts have significantly lowered the risk for maritime accidents (#10)




Not selected "The most important factors"
- N/A (#2)
- N/A (#3)
Selected "The most important factors"
- Working time onboard the vessel.  How the working time devided among the officers. If
there are only 2 officers (captain and C/O) the probability of  navigation mistake is higher.
Also there is dependence on collision risk. (#6)
2 Phase 2: Risky situations
2.1 Multi-criteria Rating: (1) NAVE, (2) ROPIN, (3) INKNOW, (4) RADAR/GV, (5)
RADAR/PV, 6 VISUAL, 7 REACGA/REACSO, 8 COE, 9 SOFO, 10 GWNEG, 11 SONEG
2.1.1.T0 Phase 2, option 1 NAVE  (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
15 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 2.1.1
NAVE  NAVE: Navigation error (equipment failure / reading error) = navigation error due to human
error, equipment failure, ignorance, etc.
Phase 2, option 1 NAVE  (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "(1) NAVE". 4 selections of 18 items.
Ratings submitted: 15. Total selections 50. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
1 How important is this factor in creating a risky situation in the GOFREP area?
1. Not very important
2
2 2. Quite important 6
3 3. Very important 8
4 IF YOU EVALUATED THIS FACTOR AS A VERY IMPORTANT, answer the following
questions?
How often does this factor occur?
3
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2 Phase 2: Risky situations 2.1.2.T0 Phase 2, option 2 ROPIN
(multiple selection) sorted by Source
order
Report GOFREP workshop
Phase 2, option 1 NAVE  (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "(1) NAVE". 4 selections of 18 items.
Ratings submitted: 15. Total selections 50. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
1. Once during 10 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator)
5 2. Once during 100 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 3
6 3. Once during 1000 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 3
7 4. Rarely 1
8 In which area does this factor most probably occur?
A. 1. Western border - Hanko separation area east
0
9 B. 2. Hanko frontal zone 1
10 C. 3. Helsinki frontal zone 9
11 D. 4 Kilpilahti frontal zone 0
12 E. 5 Orregrund frontal zone 0
13 F. 6 Eastern part (Russia) 2
14 4. In which circumstances does this most probably happen?
A. In any circumstances
5
15 B. Mostly in rough seas 3
16 C. Mostly in fog 0
17 D. Mostly during the night 2
18 E. Mostly while traffic peaks 2
2.1.2.T0 Phase 2, option 2 ROPIN (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
15 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 2.1.2
ROPIN  ROPIN: Route planning wrong = Route planning is wrong due to negligence,
misunderstanding, etc.
Phase 2, option 2 ROPIN (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "(2) ROPIN". 4 selections of 18 items.
Ratings submitted: 15. Total selections 37. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
1 How important is this factor in creating a risky situation in the GOFREP area?
1. Not very important
2
2 2. Quite important 10
3 3. Very important 3
4 IF YOU EVALUATED THIS FACTOR AS A VERY IMPORTANT, answer the following
questions?
How often does this factor occur?
1. Once during 10 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator)
1
5 2. Once during 100 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 2
6 3. Once during 1000 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 1
7 4. Rarely 4
8 In which area does this factor most probably occur?
A. 1. Western border - Hanko separation area east
0
9 B. 2. Hanko frontal zone 1
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2 Phase 2: Risky situations 2.1.3.T0 Phase 2, option 3 INKNOW
(multiple selection) sorted by Source
order
Report GOFREP workshop
Phase 2, option 2 ROPIN (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "(2) ROPIN". 4 selections of 18 items.
Ratings submitted: 15. Total selections 37. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
10 C. 3. Helsinki frontal zone 2
11 D. 4 Kilpilahti frontal zone 1
12 E. 5 Orregrund frontal zone 0
13 F. 6 Eastern part (Russia) 3
14 4. In which circumstances does this most probably happen?
A. In any circumstances
4
15 B. Mostly in rough seas 0
16 C. Mostly in fog 0
17 D. Mostly during the night 2
18 E. Mostly while traffic peaks 1
2.1.3.T0 Phase 2, option 3 INKNOW (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
15 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 2.1.3
INKNOW: Insufficient knowledge  = The give-way does not understand how to comply with the
colreg-rules
Phase 2, option 3 INKNOW (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "(3) INKNOW". 4 selections of 18 items.
Ratings submitted: 15. Total selections 48. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
1 How important is this factor in creating a risky situation in the GOFREP area?
1. Not very important
0
2 2. Quite important 5
3 3. Very important 10
4 IF YOU EVALUATED THIS FACTOR AS A VERY IMPORTANT, answer the following
questions?
How often does this factor occur?
1. Once during 10 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator)
1
5 2. Once during 100 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 7
6 3. Once during 1000 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 2
7 4. Rarely 2
8 In which area does this factor most probably occur?
A. 1. Western border - Hanko separation area east
1
9 B. 2. Hanko frontal zone 0
10 C. 3. Helsinki frontal zone 7
11 D. 4 Kilpilahti frontal zone 0
12 E. 5 Orregrund frontal zone 0
13 F. 6 Eastern part (Russia) 2
14 4. In which circumstances does this most probably happen?
A. In any circumstances
4
15 B. Mostly in rough seas 0
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2 Phase 2: Risky situations 2.1.4.T0 Phase 2, option 4 RADAR/GV
(multiple selection) sorted by Source
order
Report GOFREP workshop
Phase 2, option 3 INKNOW (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "(3) INKNOW". 4 selections of 18 items.
Ratings submitted: 15. Total selections 48. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
16 C. Mostly in fog 0
17 D. Mostly during the night 1
18 E. Mostly while traffic peaks 6
2.1.4.T0 Phase 2, option 4 RADAR/GV (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
15 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 2.1.4
RADAR/GV Radar observation error under good visibility  = Error in reading the radar due to
equipment failure, poor know-how, etc under good visibility
Phase 2, option 4 RADAR/GV (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "(4) RADAR/GV". 4 selections of 18 items.
Ratings submitted: 15. Total selections 32. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
1 How important is this factor in creating a risky situation in the GOFREP area?
1. Not very important
2
2 2. Quite important 13
3 3. Very important 0
4 IF YOU EVALUATED THIS FACTOR AS A VERY IMPORTANT, answer the following
questions?
How often does this factor occur?
1. Once during 10 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator)
0
5 2. Once during 100 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 1
6 3. Once during 1000 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 1
7 4. Rarely 3
8 In which area does this factor most probably occur?
A. 1. Western border - Hanko separation area east
0
9 B. 2. Hanko frontal zone 0
10 C. 3. Helsinki frontal zone 3
11 D. 4 Kilpilahti frontal zone 1
12 E. 5 Orregrund frontal zone 0
13 F. 6 Eastern part (Russia) 1
14 4. In which circumstances does this most probably happen?
A. In any circumstances
2
15 B. Mostly in rough seas 1
16 C. Mostly in fog 1
17 D. Mostly during the night 2
18 E. Mostly while traffic peaks 1
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2 Phase 2: Risky situations 2.1.5.T0 Phase 2, option 5 RADAR/PV
(multiple selection) sorted by Source
order
Report GOFREP workshop
2.1.5.T0 Phase 2, option 5 RADAR/PV (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
14 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 2.1.5
RADAR/PV: Radar observation error under poor visibility  = Error in reading the radar due to
equipment failure, poor know-how, etc under poor visibility
Phase 2, option 5 RADAR/PV (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "(5) RADAR/PV". 4 selections of 18 items.
Ratings submitted: 14. Total selections 42. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
1 How important is this factor in creating a risky situation in the GOFREP area?
1. Not very important
1
2 2. Quite important 7
3 3. Very important 6
4 IF YOU EVALUATED THIS FACTOR AS A VERY IMPORTANT, answer the following
questions?
How often does this factor occur?
1. Once during 10 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator)
0
5 2. Once during 100 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 4
6 3. Once during 1000 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 2
7 4. Rarely 3
8 In which area does this factor most probably occur?
A. 1. Western border - Hanko separation area east
1
9 B. 2. Hanko frontal zone 1
10 C. 3. Helsinki frontal zone 4
11 D. 4 Kilpilahti frontal zone 0
12 E. 5 Orregrund frontal zone 0
13 F. 6 Eastern part (Russia) 2
14 4. In which circumstances does this most probably happen?
A. In any circumstances
1
15 B. Mostly in rough seas 2
16 C. Mostly in fog 4
17 D. Mostly during the night 3
18 E. Mostly while traffic peaks 1
2.1.6.T0 Phase 2, option 6 VISUAL (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
6 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 2.1.6
VISUAL: Visual observation failure  = Visual observation of the traffic pattern has failed under good
visibility due e.g. fatigue, no-one performing look-out, etc.
Phase 2, option 6 VISUAL (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "6 VISUAL". 4 selections of 18 items.
Ratings submitted: 6. Total selections 24. Abstentions not permitted. Item list not randomized.
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2 Phase 2: Risky situations 2.1.7.T0 Phase 2, option 7
REACGA/REACSO (multiple selection)
sorted by Source order
Report GOFREP workshop
Nr Item Selections
1 How important is this factor in creating a risky situation in the GOFREP area?
1. Not very important
0
2 2. Quite important 4
3 3. Very important 2
4 IF YOU EVALUATED THIS FACTOR AS A VERY IMPORTANT, answer the following
questions?
How often does this factor occur?
1. Once during 10 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator)
0
5 2. Once during 100 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 2
6 3. Once during 1000 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 1
7 4. Rarely 3
8 In which area does this factor most probably occur?
A. 1. Western border - Hanko separation area east
2
9 B. 2. Hanko frontal zone 0
10 C. 3. Helsinki frontal zone 3
11 D. 4 Kilpilahti frontal zone 0
12 E. 5 Orregrund frontal zone 0
13 F. 6 Eastern part (Russia) 1
14 4. In which circumstances does this most probably happen?
A. In any circumstances
3
15 B. Mostly in rough seas 0
16 C. Mostly in fog 0
17 D. Mostly during the night 2
18 E. Mostly while traffic peaks 1
2.1.7.T0 Phase 2, option 7 REACGA/REACSO (multiple selection) sorted by Source
order
13 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 2.1.7
REACCA/REACSO  REACGA/REACSO: Restricted manoeuvre options  = Restricted manoeuvring due to
vessel properties, traffic pattern, fairway properties, etc.
Phase 2, option 7 REACGA/REACSO (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "7 REACGA/REACSO". 4 selections of 18 items.
Ratings submitted: 13. Total selections 27. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
1 How important is this factor in creating a risky situation in the GOFREP area?
1. Not very important
3
2 2. Quite important 8
3 3. Very important 1
4 IF YOU EVALUATED THIS FACTOR AS A VERY IMPORTANT, answer the following
questions?
How often does this factor occur?
1. Once during 10 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator)
0
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2 Phase 2: Risky situations 2.1.8.T0 Phase 2, option 8 COE (multiple
selection) sorted by Source order
Report GOFREP workshop
Phase 2, option 7 REACGA/REACSO (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "7 REACGA/REACSO". 4 selections of 18 items.
Ratings submitted: 13. Total selections 27. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
5 2. Once during 100 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 1
6 3. Once during 1000 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 0
7 4. Rarely 4
8 In which area does this factor most probably occur?
A. 1. Western border - Hanko separation area east
1
9 B. 2. Hanko frontal zone 0
10 C. 3. Helsinki frontal zone 0
11 D. 4 Kilpilahti frontal zone 0
12 E. 5 Orregrund frontal zone 1
13 F. 6 Eastern part (Russia) 2
14 4. In which circumstances does this most probably happen?
A. In any circumstances
1
15 B. Mostly in rough seas 1
16 C. Mostly in fog 0
17 D. Mostly during the night 2
18 E. Mostly while traffic peaks 2
2.1.8.T0 Phase 2, option 8 COE (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
14 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 2.1.8
COE: Communication error  = Communication efforts fail due to technical, cultural, linguistic etc
problems. Also starting the communication effort too late is a problem factor.
Phase 2, option 8 COE (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "8 COE". 4 selections of 18 items.
Ratings submitted: 14. Total selections 43. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
1 How important is this factor in creating a risky situation in the GOFREP area?
1. Not very important
0
2 2. Quite important 5
3 3. Very important 9
4 IF YOU EVALUATED THIS FACTOR AS A VERY IMPORTANT, answer the following
questions?
How often does this factor occur?
1. Once during 10 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator)
1
5 2. Once during 100 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 4
6 3. Once during 1000 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 2
7 4. Rarely 3
8 In which area does this factor most probably occur?
A. 1. Western border - Hanko separation area east
1
9 B. 2. Hanko frontal zone 0
10 C. 3. Helsinki frontal zone 2
11 D. 4 Kilpilahti frontal zone 0
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2 Phase 2: Risky situations 2.1.9.T0 Phase 2, option 9 SOFO
(multiple selection) sorted by Source
order
Report GOFREP workshop
Phase 2, option 8 COE (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "8 COE". 4 selections of 18 items.
Ratings submitted: 14. Total selections 43. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
12 E. 5 Orregrund frontal zone 2
13 F. 6 Eastern part (Russia) 5
14 4. In which circumstances does this most probably happen?
A. In any circumstances
4
15 B. Mostly in rough seas 0
16 C. Mostly in fog 0
17 D. Mostly during the night 1
18 E. Mostly while traffic peaks 4
2.1.9.T0 Phase 2, option 9 SOFO (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
14 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 2.1.9
SOFO: Stand-on fails to observe  = Stand-on vessel does not observe the threat of the give-way due
to observational error
Phase 2, option 9 SOFO (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "9 SOFO". 4 selections of 18 items.
Ratings submitted: 14. Total selections 42. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
1 How important is this factor in creating a risky situation in the GOFREP area?
1. Not very important
3
2 2. Quite important 6
3 3. Very important 5
4 IF YOU EVALUATED THIS FACTOR AS A VERY IMPORTANT, answer the following
questions?
How often does this factor occur?
1. Once during 10 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator)
1
5 2. Once during 100 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 0
6 3. Once during 1000 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 3
7 4. Rarely 5
8 In which area does this factor most probably occur?
A. 1. Western border - Hanko separation area east
0
9 B. 2. Hanko frontal zone 0
10 C. 3. Helsinki frontal zone 7
11 D. 4 Kilpilahti frontal zone 1
12 E. 5 Orregrund frontal zone 0
13 F. 6 Eastern part (Russia) 2
14 4. In which circumstances does this most probably happen?
A. In any circumstances
5
15 B. Mostly in rough seas 0
16 C. Mostly in fog 1
17 D. Mostly during the night 0
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2 Phase 2: Risky situations 2.1.10.T0 Phase 2, option 10 GWNEG
(multiple selection) sorted by Source
order
Report GOFREP workshop
Phase 2, option 9 SOFO (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "9 SOFO". 4 selections of 18 items.
Ratings submitted: 14. Total selections 42. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
18 E. Mostly while traffic peaks 3
2.1.10.T0 Phase 2, option 10 GWNEG (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
14 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 2.1.10
GWNEG: Neglect by give-way  = Give-way vessel behaves like a cowboy and forces stand-on vessel to
react.
Phase 2, option 10 GWNEG (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "10 GWNEG". 4 selections of 18 items.
Ratings submitted: 14. Total selections 46. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
1 How important is this factor in creating a risky situation in the GOFREP area?
1. Not very important
0
2 2. Quite important 6
3 3. Very important 8
4 IF YOU EVALUATED THIS FACTOR AS A VERY IMPORTANT, answer the following
questions?
How often does this factor occur?
1. Once during 10 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator)
0
5 2. Once during 100 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 3
6 3. Once during 1000 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 3
7 4. Rarely 5
8 In which area does this factor most probably occur?
A. 1. Western border - Hanko separation area east
2
9 B. 2. Hanko frontal zone 0
10 C. 3. Helsinki frontal zone 6
11 D. 4 Kilpilahti frontal zone 0
12 E. 5 Orregrund frontal zone 0
13 F. 6 Eastern part (Russia) 2
14 4. In which circumstances does this most probably happen?
A. In any circumstances
5
15 B. Mostly in rough seas 1
16 C. Mostly in fog 1
17 D. Mostly during the night 1
18 E. Mostly while traffic peaks 3
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2 Phase 2: Risky situations 2.1.11.T0 Phase 2, option 11  SONEG
(multiple selection) sorted by Source
order
Report GOFREP workshop
2.1.11.T0 Phase 2, option 11  SONEG (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
14 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 2.1.11
SONEG: Neglect by stand-on  = Stand-on wants to show he has the right not to take other vessels into
account, and does not cooperate for the benefit of all.
Phase 2, option 11  SONEG (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "11 SONEG". 4 selections of 18 items.
Ratings submitted: 14. Total selections 42. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
1 How important is this factor in creating a risky situation in the GOFREP area?
1. Not very important
2
2 2. Quite important 8
3 3. Very important 4
4 IF YOU EVALUATED THIS FACTOR AS A VERY IMPORTANT, answer the following
questions?
How often does this factor occur?
1. Once during 10 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator)
0
5 2. Once during 100 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 1
6 3. Once during 1000 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 1
7 4. Rarely 7
8 In which area does this factor most probably occur?
A. 1. Western border - Hanko separation area east
1
9 B. 2. Hanko frontal zone 2
10 C. 3. Helsinki frontal zone 4
11 D. 4 Kilpilahti frontal zone 0
12 E. 5 Orregrund frontal zone 0
13 F. 6 Eastern part (Russia) 2
14 4. In which circumstances does this most probably happen?
A. In any circumstances
6
15 B. Mostly in rough seas 0
16 C. Mostly in fog 0
17 D. Mostly during the night 1
18 E. Mostly while traffic peaks 3
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2 Phase 2: Risky situations 2.1.M0 (1) NAVE, (2) ROPIN, (3)
INKNOW, (4) RADAR/GV, (5) RADAR/PV,
6 VISUAL, 7 REACGA/REACSO, 8 COE, 9
SOFO, 10 GWNEG, 11 SONEG (Criteria:
(1) NAVE / (2) ROPIN / (3) INKNOW / (4)
RADAR/GV / (5) RADAR/PV / 6 VISUAL /
7 REACGA/REACSO / 8 COE / 9 SOFO / 10
G
Report GOFREP workshop
2.1.M0 (1) NAVE, (2) ROPIN, (3) INKNOW, (4) RADAR/GV, (5) RADAR/PV, 6
VISUAL, 7 REACGA/REACSO, 8 COE, 9 SOFO, 10 GWNEG, 11 SONEG (Criteria: (1)
NAVE / (2) ROPIN / (3) INKNOW / (4) RADAR/GV / (5) RADAR/PV / 6 VISUAL / 7
REACGA/REACSO / 8 COE / 9 SOFO / 10 GWNEG / 11 SONEG)
Specification of the Ratings
Criterion: "(1) NAVE". Rating 2.1.1 "NAVE" Select 4 of 18. Ratings submitted: 15. Total selections: 50.
Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Criterion: "(2) ROPIN". Rating 2.1.2 "ROPIN" Select 4 of 18. Ratings submitted: 15. Total selections:
37. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Criterion: "(3) INKNOW". Rating 2.1.3 "INKNOW: Insufficient knowledge" Select 4 of 18. Ratings
submitted: 15. Total selections: 48.   Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Criterion: "(4) RADAR/GV". Rating 2.1.4 "RADAR/GV Radar observation error under good visibility"
Select 4 of 18. Ratings submitted: 15. Total selections: 32.   Abstentions permitted. Item list not
randomized.
Criterion: "(5) RADAR/PV". Rating 2.1.5 "RADAR/PV: Radar observation error under poor visibility"
Select 4 of 18. Ratings submitted: 14. Total selections: 42.   Abstentions permitted. Item list not
randomized.
Criterion: "6 VISUAL". Rating 2.1.6 "VISUAL: Visual observation failure" Select 4 of 18. Ratings
submitted: 6. Total selections: 24.   Abstentions not permitted. Item list not randomized.
Criterion: "7 REACGA/REACSO". Rating 2.1.7 "REACCA/REACSO" Select 4 of 18. Ratings submitted: 13.
Total selections: 27.   Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Criterion: "8 COE". Rating 2.1.8 "COE: Communication error" Select 4 of 18. Ratings submitted: 14.
Total selections: 43.   Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Criterion: "9 SOFO". Rating 2.1.9 "SOFO: Stand-on fails to observe" Select 4 of 18. Ratings submitted:
14. Total selections: 42.   Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Criterion: "10 GWNEG". Rating 2.1.10 "GWNEG: Neglect by give-way" Select 4 of 18. Ratings
submitted: 14. Total selections: 46.   Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Criterion: "11 SONEG". Rating 2.1.11 "SONEG: Neglect by stand-on" Select 4 of 18. Ratings submitted:
14. Total selections: 42.   Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
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2 Phase 2: Risky situations 2.1.M0 (1) NAVE, (2) ROPIN, (3) INKNOW, (4) RADAR/GV, (5) RADAR/PV, 6
VISUAL, 7 REACGA/REACSO, 8 COE, 9 SOFO, 10 GWNEG, 11 SONEG (Criteria:
(1) NAVE / (2) ROPIN / (3) INKNOW / (4) RADAR/GV / (5) RADAR/PV / 6
VISUAL / 7 REACGA/REACSO / 8 COE / 9 SOFO / 10 G
Report GOFREP workshop
(1) NAVE, (2) ROPIN, (3) INKNOW, (4) RADAR/GV, (5) RADAR/PV, 6 VISUAL, 7 REACGA/REACSO, 8 COE, 9 SOFO, 10 GWNEG, 11 SONEG (Multi-criteria
table) sorted by Source order




Nr Item Selections Selections Selections Selections Selections
1 How important is this factor in creating a risky situation in the
GOFREP area?
1. Not very important
2 2 0 2 1
2 2. Quite important 6 10 5 13 7
3 3. Very important 8 3 10 0 6
4 IF YOU EVALUATED THIS FACTOR AS A VERY IMPORTANT, answer
the following questions?
How often does this factor occur?
1. Once during 10 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-
operator)
3 1 1 0 0
5 2. Once during 100 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-
operator)
3 2 7 1 4
6 3. Once during 1000 voyages (ship master) or work shifts
(VTS-operator)
3 1 2 1 2
7 4. Rarely 1 4 2 3 3
8 In which area does this factor most probably occur?
A. 1. Western border - Hanko separation area east
0 0 1 0 1
9 B. 2. Hanko frontal zone 1 1 0 0 1
10 C. 3. Helsinki frontal zone 9 2 7 3 4
11 D. 4 Kilpilahti frontal zone 0 1 0 1 0
12 E. 5 Orregrund frontal zone 0 0 0 0 0
13 F. 6 Eastern part (Russia) 2 3 2 1 2
14 4. In which circumstances does this most probably happen?
A. In any circumstances
5 4 4 2 1
15 B. Mostly in rough seas 3 0 0 1 2
16 C. Mostly in fog 0 0 0 1 4
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2 Phase 2: Risky situations 2.1.M0 (1) NAVE, (2) ROPIN, (3) INKNOW, (4) RADAR/GV, (5) RADAR/PV, 6
VISUAL, 7 REACGA/REACSO, 8 COE, 9 SOFO, 10 GWNEG, 11 SONEG (Criteria:
(1) NAVE / (2) ROPIN / (3) INKNOW / (4) RADAR/GV / (5) RADAR/PV / 6
VISUAL / 7 REACGA/REACSO / 8 COE / 9 SOFO / 10 G
Report GOFREP workshop
(1) NAVE, (2) ROPIN, (3) INKNOW, (4) RADAR/GV, (5) RADAR/PV, 6 VISUAL, 7 REACGA/REACSO, 8 COE, 9 SOFO, 10 GWNEG, 11 SONEG (Multi-criteria
table) sorted by Source order




Nr Item Selections Selections Selections Selections Selections
17 D. Mostly during the night 2 2 1 2 3
18 E. Mostly while traffic peaks 2 1 6 1 1
(1) NAVE, (2) ROPIN, (3) INKNOW, (4) RADAR/GV, (5) RADAR/PV, 6 VISUAL, 7 REACGA/REACSO, 8 COE, 9 SOFO, 10 GWNEG, 11 SONEG (Multi-criteria
table) sorted by Source order
6 VISUAL 7
REACGA/REACSO
8 COE 9 SOFO 10 GWNEG
Nr Item Selections Selections Selections Selections Selections
1 How important is this factor in creating a risky situation in the
GOFREP area?
1. Not very important
0 3 0 3 0
2 2. Quite important 4 8 5 6 6
3 3. Very important 2 1 9 5 8
4 IF YOU EVALUATED THIS FACTOR AS A VERY IMPORTANT,
answer the following questions?
How often does this factor occur?
1. Once during 10 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-
operator)
0 0 1 1 0
5 2. Once during 100 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-
operator)
2 1 4 0 3
6 3. Once during 1000 voyages (ship master) or work shifts
(VTS-operator)
1 0 2 3 3
7 4. Rarely 3 4 3 5 5
8 In which area does this factor most probably occur?
A. 1. Western border - Hanko separation area east
2 1 1 0 2
Appendix 5 / 23 (30)
2 Phase 2: Risky situations 2.1.M0 (1) NAVE, (2) ROPIN, (3) INKNOW, (4) RADAR/GV, (5) RADAR/PV, 6
VISUAL, 7 REACGA/REACSO, 8 COE, 9 SOFO, 10 GWNEG, 11 SONEG (Criteria:
(1) NAVE / (2) ROPIN / (3) INKNOW / (4) RADAR/GV / (5) RADAR/PV / 6
VISUAL / 7 REACGA/REACSO / 8 COE / 9 SOFO / 10 G
Report GOFREP workshop
(1) NAVE, (2) ROPIN, (3) INKNOW, (4) RADAR/GV, (5) RADAR/PV, 6 VISUAL, 7 REACGA/REACSO, 8 COE, 9 SOFO, 10 GWNEG, 11 SONEG (Multi-criteria
table) sorted by Source order
6 VISUAL 7
REACGA/REACSO
8 COE 9 SOFO 10 GWNEG
Nr Item Selections Selections Selections Selections Selections
9 B. 2. Hanko frontal zone 0 0 0 0 0
10 C. 3. Helsinki frontal zone 3 0 2 7 6
11 D. 4 Kilpilahti frontal zone 0 0 0 1 0
12 E. 5 Orregrund frontal zone 0 1 2 0 0
13 F. 6 Eastern part (Russia) 1 2 5 2 2
14 4. In which circumstances does this most probably happen?
A. In any circumstances
3 1 4 5 5
15 B. Mostly in rough seas 0 1 0 0 1
16 C. Mostly in fog 0 0 0 1 1
17 D. Mostly during the night 2 2 1 0 1
18 E. Mostly while traffic peaks 1 2 4 3 3
(1) NAVE, (2) ROPIN, (3) INKNOW, (4) RADAR/GV, (5) RADAR/PV, 6 VISUAL, 7 REACGA/REACSO, 8 COE, 9 SOFO, 10 GWNEG, 11
SONEG (Multi-criteria table) sorted by Source order
11 SONEG
Nr Item Selections
1 How important is this factor in creating a risky situation in the GOFREP area?
1. Not very important
2
2 2. Quite important 8
3 3. Very important 4
4 IF YOU EVALUATED THIS FACTOR AS A VERY IMPORTANT, answer the following questions?
How often does this factor occur?
1. Once during 10 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator)
0
5 2. Once during 100 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 1
6 3.           Once during 1000 voyages (ship master) or work shifts (VTS-operator) 1
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2 Phase 2: Risky situations 2.1.M0 (1) NAVE, (2) ROPIN, (3) INKNOW, (4) RADAR/GV, (5) RADAR/PV, 6
VISUAL, 7 REACGA/REACSO, 8 COE, 9 SOFO, 10 GWNEG, 11 SONEG (Criteria:
(1) NAVE / (2) ROPIN / (3) INKNOW / (4) RADAR/GV / (5) RADAR/PV / 6
VISUAL / 7 REACGA/REACSO / 8 COE / 9 SOFO / 10 G
Report GOFREP workshop
(1) NAVE, (2) ROPIN, (3) INKNOW, (4) RADAR/GV, (5) RADAR/PV, 6 VISUAL, 7 REACGA/REACSO, 8 COE, 9 SOFO, 10 GWNEG, 11
SONEG (Multi-criteria table) sorted by Source order
11 SONEG
Nr Item Selections
7 4. Rarely 7
8 In which area does this factor most probably occur?
A. 1. Western border - Hanko separation area east
1
9 B. 2. Hanko frontal zone 2
10 C. 3. Helsinki frontal zone 4
11 D. 4 Kilpilahti frontal zone 0
12 E. 5 Orregrund frontal zone 0
13 F. 6 Eastern part (Russia) 2
14 4. In which circumstances does this most probably happen?
A. In any circumstances
6
15 B. Mostly in rough seas 0
16 C. Mostly in fog 0
17 D. Mostly during the night 1
18 E. Mostly while traffic peaks 3
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3 Phase 3: Improving the risk management and the traffic fluency 2.2 Phase 2. Comparing GOFREP
and other areas
Report GOFREP workshop
2.2 Phase 2. Comparing GOFREP and other areas
Number of participants: 13
Participant instructions:
Compare the GOFREP risks to risks in other areas
All contributions are anonymous.
Not categorized (2)
1. Do the risk factors (1-11) you chose as the most important apply only in the GOFREP area,
or also in other traffic areas?
· Yes, in all areas (#3)
· Yes (#4)




· May be applyed  in VTS areas providing INS (coastal VTS) (#10)
· Yes in all areas (#15)
2. Do the GOFREP operations increase traffic discipline compared to other unsurveilled
traffic areas? How significantly? Please comment?
· yes. (#9)
- yes (#17)
· Yes of course it does. (#11)
- Ofcourse it does change your behaviour when you know that you are under surveilance.
(#13)
· Yes Gofrep operations increase dicipline from 60 violations per year to 9 from 2004 to
2016. (#12)
· It is very difficult to say how significantly! (#14)
· Yes. GOFREP  seems  like coastal VTS (#16)
· Yes (#18)
· Yes, (#19)
· Very significantfly. Surveillance and possible sanctions keep all the sailors on track. Bad
behaviour can also affect company's reputation as a reliable partner. (#20)
3 Phase 3: Improving the risk management and the traffic fluency
3.1 Rating: Phase 3, Lowering the most significant risks
3.1.1.T0 Phase 3, Lowering the most significant risks (multiple selection) sorted
by Source order
14 persons have submitted their ratings.
The Host does not participate in the Rating.
Participant instructions of Rating 3.1.1
Which of the following means are the best in controlling the most important risk factors? How should
these be developed?  In phase 2, following risk factors were rated as the most important ones: NAVE,
INKNOW,  COE,  GWNEG
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3 Phase 3: Improving the risk management and the traffic fluency 3.1.1.T0 Phase 3, Lowering the
most significant risks (multiple
selection) sorted by Source order
Report GOFREP workshop
Phase 3, Lowering the most significant risks (multiple selection) sorted by Source order
Criterion "The most effective means". 3 selections of 7 items.
Ratings submitted: 14. Total selections 37. Abstentions permitted. Item list not randomized.
Nr Item Selections
1 Traffic separation scheme 8
2 GOFREP-operations 11
3 Vessel technology, maintenance practices 2
4 Communication between ships 6
5 Competence of vessel staff 5
6 Other navigational aids 3
7 Other, specify? 2
Traffic separation scheme
Selected "The most effective means"
- Vessels stay in traffic lines. (#2)
- Keeping TSS-s updated in accordance with the real traffic patterns (#4)
- More TSS areas (#5)
- TSS keeps vessels apart from each other relatively good and they dont cross each others
courses. Clear and easy to navigate. (#6)
- At the moment ok (#7)
GOFREP-operations
Selected "The most effective means"
- More communication, closer follow up on ships movements (#2)
- Different level of intervention on different areas is maybe one of the problem. Keeping
same standards on all of the areas/operators. (#3)
- Uniformed practises among all operators and VTS centres, so that all parties should
intervene same kind of navigational situations at same distances / time frames. Less talk on
traffic channels to avoid fatigue to radio noise -> collect of voyage info shouldbe more
reliable electronically. (#4)
- There is always something to improve. There should not be operative differences between
centres. (#5)
- NAVE, INKNOWN, COE, GWNEG: GOFREP operators should quide and assist vessel in clear
cases. (#6)
- - Cooperation between the different GOFREP operations. eg. Tallin traffic, Helsinki traffic...
(#8)
- More interference and coordination between GOFREP operators to influence fluency of
traffic patterns (e.g. traffic organisation service), specially during high traffic dencity periods
in GOFREP 3 area. (#11)
- Commonicatoin between ships and Gofrep operators could be more active. Instead on just
following gofrep operators cuold give more information and also "orders". (#12)
Vessel technology, maintenance practices
Selected "The most effective means"
- AIS information helps to navigate,  because you can see the destination of the target. (#2)
- Route exchange system between the VTS and Vessel would be a good solution to develope
further (#4)
Communication between ships
Selected "The most effective means"
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3 Phase 3: Improving the risk management and the traffic fluency 3.2 Phase 3. improving the risk
management and traffic fluency
(Brainstorm)
Report GOFREP workshop
- development of E-navigation sistems (mona-lisa, ENCI) (#1)
- AIS, because you can see the vessels names. (#2)
- This is most essential issue.  Important to encourage the offisers on watch always to make
VHF contact when needed. Case simulation in training center. (#5)
- Inform the others about your intensions before it is too late (#8)
Competence of vessel staff
Selected "The most effective means"
- Control methods for the training and certification of seafares in different countries to
ensure that the STCW standards are met (#2)
- Cheapest is not always the best. (#3)
- Better language education, better navigational andequipment related education. (#4)
- Better crews make better decisions (#9)
Other navigational aids
Selected "The most effective means"
- AIS that shows the passage plan on the electronic chart displays of other vessels (#1)
- Route plan exchange between all parties.-> Routeplans to be seen on vessels ecdis systems
as well as on VTS systems. (#2)
- Virtual waypoint system woud help to provide navigational assistance if needed or operator
deems it necessary (e.g. setting the optimal/safe route...) (#4)
Other, specify?
Selected "The most effective means"
- - Learn from "Near miss situations" How can we handle it better.The ENSI (Enhanced
Navigation Support Information)? (#1)
- Common understanding about VTS and Ship Reporting Systems. What mariners can expect
from VTS and SRS operators. Topic should be applied to mariners basic education. (#2)
3.2 Phase 3. improving the risk management and traffic fluency (Brainstorm)
Number of participants: 14
Not categorized (3)
1. Do cruise ships and fast passenger vessels affect the collision risk?
A. The collision risk increases
B. No effect
· B (#4)
- Areas 2 and 3 are the high risk areas (#13)
- Trafic to Hanko leaves and enters the TSS with such a course that makes give-way
vessels manouvre with big course changes. That could be avoided by making TSS a bit
longer (eastbound)  so the trafic to/from Hanko would meet other trafic with 90 deg
angle. (#29)
· B (#5)
· no effect (#6)
· B (#7)
· A Area 3 (#8)
- High speed crafts mainly keep away from other traffic but if we are talking about
passenger ferries then it is a bit different. Cause of schedules and fuel economy they tend
to play in a risky area of leaving little or very little leeway for any error in traffic situations
or leaving/approaching ports. (#21)
- Large and fast vessels navigate in this area quite a same time usually, creating an extra
traffic peak on top of the other, year round traffic. This affects directly to situations
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4 Phase 4: feedback 4.1 Phase 4, Feedback from the
workshop (Brainstorm)
Report GOFREP workshop
between vessels, and also indirectly when many vessels need to do manouvers -> domino
effect. (#23)
· B No Effect (#11)
· B (#15)
· B (#17)
· There is Finnish/Estonian company who plans to operate with WIG (wing in ground) crafts
between HEL and TLL. The WIG craft speed is ~ 200 km/h. This influences significantly risk
of collision and specially with small ships which cant be monitored by AIS. (#30)
2. Are the previously considered risk management means (Traffic separation scheme,
GOFREP-operations, Vessel technology, maintenance practices, Communication between
ships, Skills of vessel staff, Other navigational aids or the Other means you specified
yourself) effective enough for dealing with these risks also?
· yes (#9)
· Yes, they are enough! (#10)
· Yes + Fatigue (#12)
· Enough (#16)
· yes (#18)
· +working time onboard, number of  mates (#19)
· Yes (#20)
· Yes (#31)
3. Which functions should be developed to improve the traffic fluency in the GOFREP-area
without increasing the risk levels?
· stricter follow up on ships movements by vys operator (#14)
· More automatic monitoring on vessels (#22)
· Routeplanning must sen to the traffic centres. (#24)
- Good idea (#28)
· development of e-navigation segment (#25)
· Sanctions for those not following GOFREP's instructions. Public Web site that shows the
companies / vessels not complying with the TSS and other regulations. (#26)
- Good idea (#27)
- very good idea! (#35)
· Traffic organisation services (IALA) (#32)
· Routeplans exchange between all parties, vessels routeplans could be seen on all ecdis and
vts equipment in the area. (#33)
- Good idea. (#34)
· excellent idea (#36)
4 Phase 4: feedback
4.1 Phase 4, Feedback from the workshop (Brainstorm)
Number of participants: 18
Participant instructions:
Give feedback about this workshop
All contributions are anonymous.
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4 Phase 4: feedback 4.1 Phase 4, Feedback from the
workshop (Brainstorm)
Report GOFREP workshop
· We all are expert on our working areas. (#8)
· yes (#10)
- yes (#28)
· It seems so (#11)
· Yes, but should have more masters and officers navigating in the area (#12)
- Well said. (#24)
- more master and officers could have given valuable feedback (#47)
· Well i sincerely hope that there would be more seafarers participating that are navigating in
these areas frequently. (#14)
· Yes (#16)
· Yes. Would have been nice to hear from officers trading Helsinki-Tallin eg. Tallink, Viking.
(#23)
· SAR / MRCC -authorities (Border Guard) did not participate to the workshop (#25)
· Only when there are some issues or problems to solve or something to discuss (#26)
· Yes, enought experience but the questions were a little bit hard to understand. (#27)
B. Is there some topic that should have been covered in this workshop, but was missing?
· coverage sufficient (#35)
· Ice breaking assistance?? (#37)
· Future of the GOFREP and ongoing projects. (#38)
· underwater surveys, construction works (cables, pipelines) (#42)
· Annual accident rate before GOFREP and statistics how the situation has developed in the
GOFREP area. (#44)
· Concrete likes and dislikes of gogrep operations. May be some real case analyses (#45)
C. Should this kind of workshops be arranged regularly? Not at all? Every other year? Once in
every 5 years?
· once in every 5 years. (#36)
· Yes, once in every three years (#39)
· every two years (#40)
· in 3 years period. Case study in advance. (#41)
· every second year but abit lighter (#43)
· Every second year.  Questionnaires to be answered (except feedback) well before the
meeting. (#46)
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